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Abstract 
Sociology and economics tend to focus more and more on the intermediaries 
involved in economic and social relations, in the shape of distributors, 
matchmakers, consultants, and evaluators. Once they are distinguished 
according to their forms, their types of intervention and their effects, the 
intermediaries are a helpful category in order to study the social organization 
of markets as well as the changes that operate on them, especially regarding 
the social and economic values of goods, individuals and organizations. We 
discuss in the !rst section the link between intermediaries and information, 
through an analysis of the functions they ful!ll that may explain their 
emergence, as well as the opportunistic behavior of intermediaries in relation 
to information "ows. In the second section, we adopt a more pragmatist 
perspective on issues of valuation mainly based on ”economics of 
convention”, which emphasizes the collective dynamics of valuation. We show 
how intermediaries contribute to de!ne valuation through their different 
activities and foster valuation frames that can improve the coordination of 
actors, but also reorganize the markets in different ways. We suggest an 
analytical distinction between the distribution, the temporality and the 
generality of the frames, and raise the issue of the valuation power of market 
intermediaries, their legitimation and the eventual regulation of their activities. 
Key words: intermediaries; market; valuation; evaluation; convention; 
regulation
Sociology, economics and political sciences are becoming more and 
more interested in the “intermediaries” involved in economic, political, 
and social relations; these may take the form of organizations, service 
providers, experts, prescribers, and appraisers, as well as technical and 
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administrative mechanisms. This trend is a response to the changes 
impacting a reality that is more and more structurally complex, and in 
which the heuristic value of traditional categories and distinctions 
(state/market, individual/society, producer/consumer, etc.) is declining. 
This takes place within a con!guration characterized by the increasing 
international circulation of goods, the liberalization of many activities 
and the encouragement of competition, as well as by the development 
of forms of organization by project (Boltanski and Chiapello 1999). 
These are all developments that currently offer multiple opportunities 
for intermediation. Remaining at this level of generality could lead to 
describing contemporary society as an “age of intermediaries.” 
However, this general term covers entities with heterogeneous 
identities, roles, and impacts, which we differentiate here by analyzing 
and comparing research that has been devoted to them. 
The economic activities of the intermediaries examined here consist 
in services relating to their participation in the construction, 
maintenance, or expansion of a market. We set focus on professional 
intermediaries considered as “third parties”, which intervene between 
the so called “supply” and “demand”, and whose actions have some 
effects on the economic or symbolic value of a product or an 
organization. Beyond the !gure of the “auctioneer” traditionally 
acknowledged by the standard economic theory, we can identify four 
main types of intermediaries which are more or less linked to the 
supply or the demand side: the distributors that buy and resell 
products, the matchmakers that put into contact partners of exchange, 
the consultants that produce advice to their clients (generally from the 
“supply” side) and the evaluators that evaluate products, individuals 
or organizations. Each type of intermediary can potentially be involved 
in the activity of valuation (Dewey 1918), as well as being mixed in 
the “real” economic life. Following Dewey, we consider value as a rich 
empirical and observable fact that can take many forms (price, 
aesthetic value, reputation, status), and generally be de!ned as a 
“quality” attributed to an event, a situation, an object, an organization 
or a person, under some speci!c circumstances and with certain 
consequences. This pragmatist approach will lead us to focus more on 
the activity of valuation than on value itself and to observe which 
actors are decisive in the construction of economic and symbolic 
values on markets. Our main hypothesis is that intermediaries are the 
actors who, beyond their apparent speci!c function (providing services 
of buying and selling, matching, advising and evaluating), are all 
engaged in activities of valuation that shape the market.
It is an empirical question to know to what extent each particular 
intermediary carries out each kind of activity (selling, advising, 
matching, and evaluating) and to what extent its activities involves 
valuation. In other words, the so called “evaluators” (the fourth 
category in our typology) are not the only actors that produce 
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valuations on markets, and the open de!nition of intermediary will 
help us show how (and what kind) of valuations are produced by these 
different types of intermediaries. If valuation can analytically be 
divided into the activities of evaluation (producing a judgment by 
assessing the value of something) and valorization (adding value to 
something), these two activities are often mixed in social processes of 
valuation (Beckert and Aspers 2011; Muniesa 2011; Vatin 2009).
This paper aims at discussing research belonging to two 
traditionally separated disciplines: economics and sociology. Aside 
from the development of interdisciplinary research, namely in the !eld 
of the so-called new economic sociology (Granovetter 1985; Swedberg 
2003), few works simultaneously take both disciplines into account, 
while tackling the question of intermediaries. This cross-fertilization 
will allow us to highlight their active role in the dynamics of markets, 
through networks, cognitive frames, and valuation processes, 
traditionally studied by sociology, without neglecting the issues of 
coordination, calculus, and information, which are more analyzed by 
economics. This cross-approach has recently been adopted by the 
“actor-network theory” and the French school of “economics of 
convention” (“Economie des conventions”) which both raised the 
question of how to create calculative devices which are competed in a 
“market for evaluations”. This is in line with a widely shared 
statement saying that the market is not only the aggregation of a large 
number of singular transactions but also the frame de!ning the rules 
and the format of those transactions (Beckert 2009; Fligstein 2001; 
François 2010).
In pursuing these considerations, we seek to develop in this article 
the argument that intermediaries are not only platforms for putting 
economic partners into contact, but also active entities involved in the 
construction of markets and the dynamics of valuation that drive 
them.1 Hence, our preoccupation is not only the role of intermediaries 
in making goods calculable and in matching supply and demand, but 
also their impact on the cognitive categories and the values that order 
goods, people and organizations on markets. 
To address these questions, we need to start by reviewing the 
emergence of intermediaries in economic research, a phenomenon that 
re"ects a new understanding of information "ows in markets. Thus, in 
the !rst section we discuss the link between intermediaries and 
information, through an analysis of the functions they ful!ll that may 
explain their emergence, as well as the opportunistic behavior of 
intermediaries in relation to information "ows. 
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1 This argument is also present in some recent works in political science, such as Nay 
and Smith (2002), who highlight the active role of political intermediaries in 
matching and formatting “institutional worlds” (instead of “markets” in the 
economic sociological approach). 
In the second section, we adopt a more pragmatist perspective on 
issues of valuation, mainly based on economics of convention, which 
emphasizes the collective dynamics of valuation and, in particular, the 
collective construction of criteria or principles of evaluation. Following 
this approach, valuations are not reduced to the resolution of 
information asymmetry problems, but raise the question of the 
de!nition of the relevant criteria used to judge or estimate. In the 
neoclassical approach of information search, these criteria are 
predetermined and remain unquestioned. Hence, the process of 
collective learning that leads to the relevant criteria is not taken into 
account. 
Our position is that the two approaches are complementary in the 
study of the role of market intermediaries, even though the methods 
and the behavior hypotheses are different. Indeed, most economic 
approaches try to explain why intermediaries exist (by contrast with a 
purely individual information search in an anonymous market), why 
they differentiate themselves (“marketmakers” versus “match-
makers”), and why they can have a social ef!ciency. The move 
operated by economics of convention consists in a focus on the social 
relationships and dynamics that underlie the shared de!nition of 
valuation criteria, but also on the tools, devices and moral values that 
support the way economic actors and objects are valuated and 
quali!ed. As other pragmatist approaches, economics of convention 
leads to an extension of the list of (human and non-human) actors that 
participate in the construction of markets or “commercial channels”. 
Our argument is that among these actors, intermediaries play a key 
role in the construction and/or the destabilization of these markets, 
due to their valuation power, and through their power of mediation 
between different logics, principles or worlds. 
Intermediar ies and Information: S trategic Funct ions 
and Coordination 
How is the concept of intermediary situated with respect to traditional 
economic theory? Standard economic theory is based on the !gure of 
the “auctioneer” whose primary function is to determine a fair price in 
the market. This !ction relies on the strict assumptions of the model of 
“pure and perfect competition.” Questioning the assumption of 
complete and symmetric information has led to a renewed analysis of 
the role of market intermediaries and their emergence when 
opportunities for productive exchanges have not been exhausted. 
Through these con!gurations we can explain the appearance of new 
players aiming to take advantage of market features for personal gain 
and to engage in strategic activities, in the way Adam Smith pointed 
out in The Wealth of Nations.
After Smith’s pre!guration, the elaboration of the role of 
intermediaries constitutes the starting point of the gradual 
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development of marketing as a discipline distinct from economics in 
the early twentieth century. We can refer to the seminal work of Arch 
W. Shaw (1912), which analyzed the emergence and rise of middlemen 
by focusing on the organization of market distribution. Shaw identi!es 
the general functions performed by the middleman: sharing the risk, 
transporting the goods, !nancing the operations, selling, assembling 
and assorting. As a result of the development of functional middlemen 
(insurance companies, direct transportation companies, banks), the 
author pays more attention to the function of selling (the 
communication of ideas about the goods) and the function of 
assembling and assorting, by analyzing the advantages to recourse (or 
not) to a middleman.
At the same time, marketing research has focused on the behavior 
of the consumer and, after the !fties, on how !rms may seek to 
regulate demand by de!ning the target market or de!ning the optimal 
channel of distribution (Laufer and Paradeise 1982). Nevertheless, an 
author like Philip McVey (1960) criticizes the notion of “channel of 
distribution” in which manufacturers can easily choose between 
middlemen of many types and control them. Conversely, he analyzes 
channel-building from the standpoint of the middleman’s relative 
capability of choice, while serving as purchasing agent for his 
customers rather than as selling agent for the manufacturer. From this 
more active approach to the role played by middlemen attached to 
their current customers group, McVey emphasizes the way they build 
some unusual product combinations or packaged assortments well-
!tted to individual customers. In certain cases, the strength of the 
middleman is so great that it becomes impossible for a manufacturer 
to tap the market.
The emergence of intermediaries in the contemporary landscape of 
economic theory was !rst seen in research on labor markets, with the 
recognition of imperfect information (Stigler 1962). The presence of 
market intermediaries reduces the costs of the acquisition of 
information and, from a more institutionalist perspective, the 
transaction costs of negotiating and enforcing contracts (Williamson 
1985). In the early 1960s, Stigler (1962) renewed the neoclassical 
economics tradition by emphasizing the costs of searching for 
information on the labor market. Searching is costly for both workers 
and employers, and in his view the raison d’être of employment 
agencies arises from the imperfect character of the information that 
both sides can gather. More speci!cally, the concept of “asymmetrical 
information” was subsequently introduced into the study of other 
markets (Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1987, discussing !nancial 
intermediation). In particular, mention may be made of the second-
hand goods markets, and Akerlof’s famous article on the market for 
“lemons” (1970), in which product certi!cation (which can be 
conducted by market intermediaries, among others) makes it possible 
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to solve the problems of so-called “adverse selection” and therefore to 
avoid the gradual decline in the “quality” of goods offered for sale.
Thus, information imperfections are at the basis of economic 
models of intermediation that argue for the cost-effectiveness of an 
intermediary in a market.2 According to these models, the existence of 
intermediaries is a response to de!ciencies in the market, or possibly 
an attempt to exploit these de!ciencies. In the latter case, we can 
highlight their strategic intent. But empirical observation shows that a 
variety of intermediaries exists, which need to be differentiated in 
terms of the characteristics of the transactions concerned, and in 
particular by the level of uncertainty that surrounds them and that 
may call for the establishment of strong mutual trust between 
exchange partners.
Responses to the Under-Investment in Information by Economic 
Agents
The most common and simple idea present in the economic literature 
states that intermediaries, by setting prices and clearing market, 
providing liquidity and immediacy, matching and searching, 
guaranteeing and monitoring transactions, provide the underlying 
microstructure of most markets (Spulber 1996). We focus here on the 
two last functions assumed by intermediaries.
Matching and Searching
According to Autor (2008), discussing the labor market), if one 
believes that the proper functioning of a market is a public good that 
provides utility to both buyers and sellers, an outcome to be expected 
in a decentralized economy is one of under-investment on the part of 
economic agents in the production of this good. Individual agents 
cannot (or choose not to) bear the costs necessary for the production 
of perfect information, the result being substantial periods of search in 
the market (with the uncertainty that the search efforts of the agents 
may not result in a match) and problems of “adverse selection.” 
Another source of inef!ciency is the positive externalities that exist in 
the matching process. Indeed, an increase in the search intensity of one 
agent increases the probability of a match, hence the payoffs to the 
other agent who does not bear such information search costs. These 
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2  Another function of an intermediary is to coordinate the actions of members of a 
congested market. A current of economic literature has developed around the work 
of A. Roth (1994) who is interested in different labor markets in which a problem of 
coordination arises between employers and graduates of the university system 
(physicians, law clerks). Drawing upon the studies of Roth (2007) on kidney 
exchange clearinghouses, the work of P. Steiner (2008) on organ gifts shows all the 
complexity of such singular matches and the importance of social relationships in the 
working of such kind of an “arena”. 
different inef!ciencies could give rise to at least two kinds of 
intermediaries (Yavas 1992): “marketmaker” and “matchmaker”, 
although there is considerable overlap in terms of the functions 
assumed by both.3 In different markets (stock, real estate, technology, 
used-car, and in a certain extent the labor market), the middleman can 
use “sell and buy” orders (as a matchmaker) to extract information 
about the demand and supply in the market and can use this 
information in choosing ask and bid prices (as a marketmaker).
Guaranteeing and Monitoring Transactions
As Stigler (1962) has focused on, information search does not only 
concern prices (distribution of wages) but also information on quality. 
Heterogeneity of quality leads to a consideration middlemen as experts 
or guarantors of quality. In his model, Biglaiser (1993) draws on the 
situation analyzed by Akerlof (1970), but restricts it to used durable 
goods, for which the buyer bears very high valuation costs. This 
justi!es the use of a middleman who has invested in the relevant 
expertise and whose investment can be amortized by frequent 
transactions. The expertise gained by these intermediaries makes it 
possible to reduce valuation costs and can thus lead buyers to employ 
them in a cumulative process. We may note that in this model the 
expert has an incentive not to cheat by offering poor-quality goods, 
since the assumption is made that the expert’s reputation is at stake. 
Biglaiser extends his model to retail and wholesale intermediaries 
which can offer many different products for sale. Consumers can also 
rely on the reputation of the intermediary without having to 
investigate the many product suppliers.
Specialized intermediaries can also reduce the problem of “moral 
hazards” in markets. As shown by Spulber (1996), when the actions of 
buyers and sellers are costly to observe, intermediaries provide 
monitoring and contracting services. For example, wine brokers 
intermediate wine exchanges between wine growers and merchants, or 
between merchants and merchants. They can earn returns through 
delegated monitoring by supervising suppliers for their customer. They 
also intervene as mediators who can help parties to adjust and solve 
con"icts (Baritaux et al. 2007).
Even though we focus on human intermediaries, one may notice 
that technological changes create new opportunities for intermediaries 
to exploit imperfect environments in which buyers and sellers meet, 
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3 This hybridity among marketing !rms has early been underlined by McVey (1960). 
That raises the issue of their classi!cation and statistical representativity.
match, and negotiate.4  From this point of view, the development of 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) promotes the 
emergence of intermediaries that enable market actors to reduce the 
costs of information search, including the costs of identifying potential 
partners. For example, the main function of job boards consists in 
posting job advertisements and building curriculum databases. Thus, 
internet-based labor market intermediaries allow multiplying job 
seeker/employer interactions (Marchal, Mellet, and Rieucau 2007). 
Distinguishing between Intermediaries in terms of Transaction 
Characteristics
With a more institutionalist perspective, transaction cost economics 
(Williamson 1985) focuses on contractual problems arising from the 
management of the relationship between intermediaries and those who 
make use of their services. This approach leads to a distinction 
between intermediaries in terms of characteristics of transactions (such 
as the level of speci!city, uncertainty, etc.) that have implications for 
the costs of measurement (the identi!cation and evaluation of 
characteristics, and negotiation) and respect for “property 
rights” (compensation, resolution of disputes, and penalties). We only 
present here the functions of matching and valuation assumed by 
intermediaries, reminding that this approach has developed a wide 
literature on channels of distribution and in particular on franchising. 
Following this perspective, Bessy and de Larquier (2001) have 
sought to model two types of matching, using the case of the labor 
market: standard matching, where the expectation of its ex post 
quality is highly reliable, based on knowledge of standard criteria 
shared by all participants in the market, and speci!c matching, which 
is more exposed to the hazards of the subsequent discovery of the level 
of quality which is subject to unique characteristics. If the matching is 
standard, an extensive search for information guarantees its quality, 
but if the matching is speci!c (or risky), intensive search is needed 
because a look at standard criteria of two potential partners may make 
them appear equivalent. One can thus distinguish between 
intermediaries who link together the standard supply and demand of 
qualities (or skills), and those who offer their clients the cost-
effectiveness of their ability to assess the “potential” of products (or 
individuals). These two reasons for the intervention of intermediaries 
(the facilitation of encounters and the assessment of quality) are linked 
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4 By studying prominent digital intermediaries, a current of economic literature show 
how ‘two-sided platforms’ provide a technology for solving externality issue in a way 
that minimizes transaction costs. In these businesses (for example software 
platforms), pricing and other strategies are strongly affected by indirect network 
effects between the two sides of the platform. Indeed the pricing structure rebalances 
costs between the two sides by internalizing the indirect externalities (Hagiu 2007; 
Evans and Schmalensee 2005).
to the degree of speci!city and thus of risk in the matching process. 
This result implies that the market of intermediation is a segmented 
one, with some intermediaries seeking to differentiate themselves from 
the rest by means of a speci!c niche area of activity in which they will 
acquire a potentially signi!cant expertise.
A similar analysis can be applied to “technology markets” and 
especially to the market for patents and licenses, which is characterized 
by high uncertainty about the value (or the ‘strength’) of intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) (Bessy 2006). In the case of “strong IPRs,” 
where private actors envision increased possibilities for exchange 
between buyers and sellers of patents, they can position themselves as 
“license agents,” participating in the development of the technology 
market by reducing transaction costs. Conversely, weaker IPRs 
increase the contractual risks and make it unlikely that a real 
technology licensing agent will become involved. Businesses will 
instead resort to alliances in the form of joint ventures. This can lead 
to the involvement of other intermediaries who facilitate alliances 
based on technological cooperation, by reducing the risk of 
opportunistic behavior.
The transaction costs approach allows distinguishing the activity of 
intermediaries according to the degree of speci!city of the assets 
underlying the transaction. But its under-socialized vision of economic 
exchange leads to study the activity of intermediaries as a succession of 
calculation processes. This approach overlooks the way this activity is 
oriented by rules of interaction de!ned in reference to groups or relies 
on personal networks providing actors with credible information.
The Go-Betweens: Trusted Resources for Innovative Activities
The intermediaries analyzed in these various studies may be specialized 
agencies whose primary activity is bringing business partners together 
and evaluating quality, or other organizations carrying out mediating 
activities secondary to some other primary activity. In these situations, 
the activities are generally combined to bene!t from economies of 
scope. In the case of technology markets, those involved may be banks 
or venture capital companies, consulting and technology transfer 
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agencies, professional organizations, law !rms specializing in 
corporate law,5 or !rms in some other sector. 
With respect to the labor market, professional organizations can 
also play a role as recruitment and training intermediaries (Bessy and 
Marchal 2009). But actors further removed from the workings of the 
labor market may also be involved in hiring, within the frame of their 
innovating activity. Research by Chauvin (2010b) on Bordeaux wines 
has shown, for example, how consultants in the wine trade who 
initially intervene with the goal of improving the quality of the wines 
may also be asked to do some recruiting for the wine producers. One 
can also quote the example of software engineering companies, who 
may approach talented young people with very speci!c expertise on 
behalf of their clients (Bessy and de Larquier 2001). Beyond the 
immediate reduction in the costs of recruitment, they guarantee the 
ability of these candidates to develop innovations in areas with a high 
degree of uncertainty, because of their own reputation as experts in the 
!eld. These temporary intermediaries are trusted resources, and it is 
important to examine more generally how this trust is built up. 
The work of Nooteboom (2000) shows how important the go-
between is in creating innovation-oriented alliances. This analysis can 
be extended to the search for partners in any business project, where 
each party needs to be sure of the “quality” of all the others. Beyond 
the claims of transaction cost economics about the role of arbitration 
by a third party in resolving disputes, Nooteboom presents a series of 
additional arguments. The intermediary can assess the relevance of the 
information transmitted by each party to the transaction and then 
inform each one separately in such a way that none of them reveals 
what they know to any of the others. This makes it possible to control 
the dissemination of information. Moreover, the intermediary can help 
build mutual con!dence early in the cooperation process, due to the 
transitive character of trust relations. It may also help to end the 
alliance by making it more progressive.
These temporary intermediaries are hardly taken into account by 
the “search approach” in which economic agents make a rational 
calculus of information search, in particular in order to assess the 
option of trading through a middleman. Now it happens that a large 
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5  Suchman (2000) has shown how the corporate law !rms in Silicon Valley have 
substantially contributed to its development, not only through innovations in 
contract matters (funding of software companies by venture capitalists), but also by 
providing guarantees of the quality of the parties concerned, and even by putting 
them into contact. These “local intermediaries” are consultants, disseminators of 
contractual and informal standards, gatekeepers, and matchmakers. This type of 
actor is on the fringe of the category of market intermediary, because it is not 
lawyers’ primary function to create matches; however, they contribute largely to the 
construction of the venture capital market that !nances high-tech companies, and to 
the related law market, building on their reputation within networks of social 
relations.
share of exchange opportunities are the by-products of other economic 
activities or result from people being embedded in on-going networks 
of interaction oriented towards economic and non-economic goals 
(Granovetter 1995).6  Such an intermediary can put different networks 
in touch with each other, thus counteracting excessive narrowness, 
which can make networks rigid and too closed. Beyond innovative 
activities, personal networks provide actors with credible and 
trustworthy information in markets in which there is no obvious 
device to judge quality (Karpik 2010).
The Strategic Behavior of Intermediaries
With a more strategic perspective, one may !nd the argument for the 
strength of “weak ties” (Granovetter 1973) in the theory developed by 
Burt (2000) concerning the “network entrepreneur”. He shows how, 
in a world where information plays a vital role in the accumulation of 
wealth, informational advantage can be obtained by connecting 
entities that were previously separated (the “structural holes”). Burt 
adopts Simmel’s concept of the tertius gaudens or “third who 
bene!ts,” to describe the role that gives one player the opportunity to 
intervene between two others or to play each of them off against the 
other. According to Burt, the power of the intermediary consists in the 
possibility to control the interactions or the networks of separated 
social actors. This control derived from “structural holes” is uncertain 
and the power of the intermediary only gives him “chances of success” 
depending on the tensions between non-redundant relationships. Burt’s 
analysis also explains that “network entrepreneurs” seek to 
accumulate reputation advantage through multiplying the number of 
links, but only to the extent of being suspected to act strategically.
The lack of powerful reputation mechanisms can give rise to more 
“opportunistic” behavior on the part of intermediaries that are 
of!cially recognized in the market. Based on a model developed by 
Hart and Kreps (1986) for speculative activity, Lesourne (1991) 
distinguishes between intermediaries involved in the proper 
functioning of the market (convergence towards a “stable” market in 
which all the possibilities for making good matches have been 
exhausted) and those whose more strategic behavior is intended to 
“destabilize” the market. 
Gautié, Godechot, and Sorignet (2005), who have observed the 
highly competitive and specialized activity of headhunters in the 
executive job market, also emphasize the role of strategic behavior. To 
be sure of completing the desired task quickly, the headhunter 
preselects one or two “clones” and surrounds them with two or three 
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6 We may also note that Rees (1966) has particularly emphasized the importance of 
networks of interpersonal relationships for guaranteeing the quality of candidates 
recruited in the labor market. 
atypical pro!les; the clients, convinced by this grouping of the scarcity 
of the kind of professionals they are looking for, make a decision more 
quickly than when faced with !ve identical individuals—and in favor 
of the “clone”. In the same way, in a very competitive context, 
headhunting agencies help to partition and segment the market by 
creating sets of employment categories, as well as contributing to 
salary in"ation. Here we see that beyond matchmaking, headhunters 
are in a position to !x prices in the market and can act as salary 
consultants, helped in this by new information technologies.
We !nd the same kind of strategic opportunities in marketing 
methods. It does seem true that contemporary modes of representation 
in advertising create an illusion of exclusivity or of scarcity (Appadurai 
1986), but other methods such as merchandising and building 
assortment, in which the process of sorting is fundamental, entertain a 
more subtle game with categories of products. As Azimont and Araujo 
(2007) show from their analysis of category review meetings between 
manufacturers of fast-moving consumer goods and retailers, these 
actors permanently negotiate the de!nition of categories of products. 
They can also play strategically with these categories by relying on 
conventions about consumers’ representations of categories. 
Misleading advertising and the sale of counterfeit products represent 
the extreme cases (and legally reprehensible) of strategic use of these 
conventions and in particular of those on which brands work (Bessy 
and Chateauraynaud 1995).
Towards a Pragmatist  Approach of the Valuation 
Power of Intermediar ies
As the transaction costs economic approach shows, the existence of 
quality standards is conducive to the development of the activity of 
intermediaries that operate on wide markets. In their absence, 
matching rely on more speci!c forms of intermediation or on the 
intervention of experts who bring trust pledges, or on networks of 
personal relationships. As we have seen with Burt’s analysis, these 
networks of relationships can be instrumentalized by “intermediaries”. 
These strategic opportunities not only show the more active role of 
intermediaries in market shaping, but also their strategic behavior 
relying on conventions about the quality of products (or individuals) 
that they have themselves contributed to build. 
The purpose of this section is, precisely, to provide a better 
understanding of these conventions, the evaluation frames they 
underpin, and the role played by the different market intermediaries in 
their genesis, diffusion and stabilization. That raises the issue of their 
valuation power and their legitimation. Once these conventions 
(setting common computing spaces) are stabilized, intermediaries can 
play their traditional role highlighted by the economic theory based on 
information search, or arbitrate between becoming a marketmaker or 
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a matchmaker. Hence, this section moves from a view of 
intermediaries as informational platforms to a conception of actors 
whose effects go beyond mere intermediation in the narrow sense, 
covering not only information but also the dynamics of valuation in 
the relevant markets. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, “economics of convention” has 
demonstrated the crucial role of intermediaries in the functioning of 
markets (Bessy and Chateauraynaud 1995; Bessy and Eymard-
Duvernay 1997). Through their activities of search and selection, and 
the nature of the relationships they sustain with sellers and buyers, 
they contribute to the social construction of markets and to the 
dissemination of the conventions or standards of quality that underpin 
them. The analysis in terms of “quality convention” allows 
formalizing the different processes by which product (or organization) 
characteristics can be de!ned, and as a result limit uncertainty about 
the agents’ behavior (Eymard-Duvernay 1989)7. Thus, the market is 
not given a priori, but is constructed by means of “third parties” who 
can be more or less stable and institutionalized, and who can structure 
various modes of activity or introduce mediation between general 
conventions of quality and more local conventions. From an empirical 
standpoint, this approach investigates the entire available body of 
instruments and mechanisms, and in particular cognitive artifacts such 
as the classi!cations and nomenclatures, advertisements, and 
assessment tests used by intermediaries in their daily work, which play 
a role that is both cognitive and normative in directing their activity. 
This idea is in line with one of the key arguments of the approaches 
in terms of “distributed cognition” (Hutchins 1995)8  and “sociology 
of translation” or “actor-network theory” (Callon 1986; Cochoy and 
Dubuisson-Quellier 2000; Mallard 2000; Cochoy 2002; Callon and 
Muniesa 2005). According to Callon (1986, 185), intermediaries take 
on diverse forms, generating an activity of intéressement, de!ned as 
“the group of actions through which one entity . . . strives to create 
and stabilize the identity of the other actors that it de!nes through the 
way it de!nes the problem”. In a later paper, Callon (1991, 134) 
de!nes an intermediary as “anything passing between actors which 
de!nes the relationship between them”. They include literary 
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7 In particular, Eymard-Duvernay (1989) refers to the “orders of worth” distinguish-
ed by Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) in their model of justi!cation of actions in the 
public arena. In this perspective, the decision to conform to a given convention is not 
reduced only to calculation, but may also consider the legitimacy of the actions 
prescribed by this convention, by making value judgments about them.
8  The aim of these investigations is to put forward the distribution of knowledge 
among individuals and between them and their socio-physical environment. The unit 
of analysis is thus no longer the individual or the social group, but a physical and 
cognitive system composed of individuals and the artifacts they employ.
inscriptions, technical artifacts, human beings and money in all its 
forms. His general thesis is that intermediaries both order (by 
describing) and form (by being involved in relationships) the “medium 
of the networks they describe” (Callon 1991, 135)9 . Callon and 
Muniesa (2005) especially highlight the effects of such actors on goods 
and the way people produce, manipulate and choose them: these 
activities imply a series of operations resulting in the “calculability of 
the good”. This idea is also developed by Beunza and Garud (2004) in 
a stimulating paper focusing on the role of Wall Street securities 
analysts as “frame-makers”. These works show that intermediaries are 
not only go-betweens or even transformers of knowledge, but are 
themselves entrepreneurs in action. They move back and forth between 
different social worlds. Far from only transferring knowledge in one 
direction, they are engaged in an exchange of knowledge through 
moving between places (Meyer 2010). Hence, the word transfer does 
not do justice to the practices of knowledge brokers, that can be better 
understood with the concept of “translation”10  which implicates an 
actual transformation of arrangements of human and non-human 
actors. 
We want !rst to highlight how frames of valuation are both used 
and created or modi!ed by intermediaries by developing more 
precisely the point of view of “economics of convention” on valuation 
and intermediaries. Unlike actor-network theorists,11 we will keep the 
term “intermediaries” while highlighting the active role they play in 
markets, but we will distinguish different types of intermediaries 
regarding the type of role they play in such worlds. Then, we propose 
a characterization of their power of valuation according to the nature 
of the valuation frame they produce, which can be more or less 
general/particular, more or less distributed/concentrated, and more or 
less durable/ephemeral.
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9  He then introduces a “purely practical” (Callon 1991, 141) distinction between 
intermediaries and actors by providing different de!nitions of what an actor is. An 
actor is “an intermediary that puts other intermediaries into circulation” (Callon 
1991, 141), actors are “those who conceive, elaborate, circulate, emit, or pension off 
intermediaries”. In other words, intermediaries are simple links between entities 
whereas actors transform the world through the expected and unexpected 
consequences of their actions.
10 The notion of “translation” has been introduced by Callon (1984), who identi!ed 
four “moments” of translation: “problematisation”, “interessement”, “enrolment” 
and “mobilisation”.
11  The word “intermediary” itself is criticized by proponents of this theory. Inter-
mediaries do not add anything new or different to the existing state of affairs; they 
merely transfer information or knowledge. By contrast, mediators make a difference 
via translation processes whose outcome cannot be predicted from the original 
conditions.
The Four Types of Intermediaries and Their (Creative) Use of 
Frames of Valuation
Every activity of valuation is based upon some “frames”, which are 
the (more or less) shared cognitive scheme that organize the valuation 
experience. Beyond the empirical and local statements made by some 
scholars about the framing role of speci!c types of intermediaries (such 
as Beunza and Garud [2004] about securities analysts as “frame-
makers”), we will show that the four types of intermediaries identi!ed 
in the introduction are implied in valuation frame-making and frame-
using activities. 
Distributors 
Trade intermediaries, traditionally considered as buying and selling 
platforms, can be analyzed as entrepreneurs of new models of 
distribution that have some consequences on frames of valuation, 
which consist more precisely here in the ways products are valorized in 
commercial channels. New modes of valorization are often linked to a 
material and immaterial framing of the market situation (Kjellberg and 
Helgesson 2007; Cochoy 2010) that goes beyond the traditional 
marketing activity of targeting customers. 
For example, Antoine Bernard de Raymond (2007) shows how 
French mass-market retailing is the product of different evolutions that 
create opportunities for new intermediaries: the transformations of 
traditional retail selling and deep changes in supplying facilities, the 
appearance of a global rationality of the circulation of products based 
on the optimization of transport "ows and a strict packaging chain 
with strict sanitary conditions. Frames of evaluation can here be 
thought of with the help of Boltanski and Thévenot’s theory of 
“cités” (2006), these cognitive worlds in which actors use some 
principles of action and justi!cation. In the case of mass-market 
retailing, the “industrial logic” is at the heart of the transformation of 
traditional production and distribution of goods (based on “domestic 
logic”) as shows the passage from “camenbert normand” to 
“camembert normé” (Boisard and Letablier 1987) which follows its 
mass-distribution by reorganizing thoroughly the logistics (in 
particular the way milk is collected) and by rede!ning the links with 
farmers.
The mass-distribution case also shows the proliferation of different 
service providers that do not buy or sells the goods (as retailers and 
wholesalers do), but various services performed like warehousing, 
transports, merchandising, and different kinds of consultancy, which 
play a role in the down-stream valuation process of products.
A second example of this active role of trade intermediaries in the 
determination of frames of evaluation can be found on the art market. 
Art dealers not only assess the value of artists by using existing and 
predetermined valuation frames (made by museums or critics for 
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example), they participate in constructing these frames through their 
engagement in the birth of artistic movements, aesthetic conventions 
but also “price conventions” that circulate on markets. Velthuis 
(2005) shows, for example, that in a social con!guration characterized 
by radical uncertainty on the quality of goods, intermediaries such as 
art dealers are likely to create convention-based prices. These 
conventions are linked to speci!c commercial channels of the 
contemporary art market in which dealers share the same conception 
of artistic work, and can then coordinate their activities with other 
agents of the commercial channel: artists, collectors… Velthuis 
identi!es three main prices “narratives” or conventions that have been 
created and used in the art market since the 1950s: “honorable prices” 
stand for the postwar gallery circuit which was con!ned to a limited 
art connoisseurs circle; “superstar prices” are characteristic of the 
1980s New York boom in which prices were rising tremendously high; 
“prudent prices” account for the more cautious commercial scene in 
the late 1990s in which galleries became real “companies”. These 
types of prices are cognitive tools that shape the meaning of the 
historical development of the art market, but they are also normative 
devices that allow art dealers to justify their practices and to compare 
with competitors. “Distinguishing different prices is a means for art 
dealers to express the values they endorse in their business 
life” (Velthuis 2005, 141).
This research highlights the plurality of valuation conventions 
within a single market and the fact that some speci!c frames of 
valuation are linked to some speci!c commercial channels. If 
intermediaries are the actors that make this link between commercial 
channels and valuation conventions possible, they may combine these 
various conventions in some different ways, and foster through their 
“friction” or their “dissonance” new valuation forms or principles 
(Stark 2009).
Matchmakers 
A second category of intermediaries includes the actors that are paid to 
put two (or more) different parties into contact. This fundamentally 
“relational” activity is not only a question of relationship and "ows of 
information, it is also an issue of cognitive frames and valuation. A 
good example of empirical research is to be found in the work of 
Bielby and Bielby (1999) on talent agencies in the American television 
market. They show how, in this labor market, “matchmakers” do not 
simply bring together television channels and program directors and 
producers. Their activities go further by creating “packages” of teams 
which include producers, scriptwriters, directors, and actors, in order 
to offer turnkey projects to the TV channels.12 Thus, they construct a 
singular product by combining resources in an innovative way and 
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12 This argument is in line with the prior analysis of McVey (1960).
participating in the segmentation of the professional world in which 
they operate. Hence, intermediaries’ activities produce categorizations 
that contribute to the cognitive segmentation of markets. As we 
showed in the !rst section, intermediaries can play a role in expanding 
the equivalencies employed in this categorization and, conversely, by 
reducing them so as to create “arti!cial scarcity” (Gautié, Godechot, 
and Sorignet 2005). This strategic way of playing with conventions of 
quality is all the more likely to occur if the market is increasing in scale 
and the demand-side clients have little expertise in this sphere.
Such an analysis is indeed useful to understand the activity of labor 
market intermediaries. Their intense activity of putting partners in 
touch leads them to develop valuation frames and categorizations of 
jobs and skills, which are all the more used by these intermediaries 
than they become stable conventions that allow a plurality of actors to 
coordinate with one another. Besides, the re"ection about 
intermediaries proposed by the “economics of convention” started 
with a focus on how conventions of skills are embedded in the 
different devices used by the recruiters on the labor market: want 
advertisements, tests, graphology analysis, nomenclatures and 
classi!cations of profession (Bessy and Eymard-Duvernay 1997; Bessy 
et al. 2001). The studies of the long-term evolution of such devices in 
France show that the private employment agencies participated in 
valorizing the logics of “skills” and “employability”. This leads to a 
valuation of the most general aptitudes of individuals to the detriment 
of the collectively negotiated employment classi!cations in speci!c 
sectors which are considered unsuitable to the new "exible 
organization forms (Boltanski and Chiapello 1999).
The search for skill transferability is in line with the possibilities 
generalist agencies have of presenting a “very competent” individual to 
a wider scope of potential recruiters. The creation and the diffusion of 
a new form of categorization or valorization can rely on a critical 
work of traditional valuation frames, but also on a more progressive 
and incremental process linked to an entrepreneurial, innovative and 
lucrative activity. In terms of convention dynamics, job agencies carry 
the representations of employers and workers that claim for a 
recognition of their individual skills, but they also create and spread 
their own valuation tools that contribute to the individualization of 
employment relationships. Hence, frames of valuation can be fostered 
by different kinds of economic actors on the job market, including 
groups of workers, employers, and professional intermediaries. This 
case raises two main questions: the question of the imputation of a 
new valuation frame to an actor (or a group of actors) and the 
question of the collective acceptance by a majority of actors. 
According to “economics of convention”, the intermediary is generally 
considered as the actor that gives the initial impulse to the valuation 
convention, and its collective acceptance may be linked to the social 
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legitimacy of the convention (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) or 
different kinds of mimetic processes (Orléan 2011). The case of 
fashion is a good illustration of these different processes by which 
valuation conventions are collectively accepted.
The ethnographic research of Ashley Mears (2011) on fashion 
models helps to understand how an “original look” appears and is 
valued through a mimetic process. This process is engaged by most 
reputed model agents that support some speci!c types of models. 
However, they cannot act only on their own: to avoid a too big price 
difference between models, agents often consult each other to set up 
“fair” prices, and conventions of prices and looks emerge from their 
interactions. This is in line with the argument raised by Velthuis 
(2005) concerning the art dealers trying to keep up their legitimacy by 
dealing with different commercial and aesthetic conventions. 
Moreover, these strategic interactions whether in fashion or in art 
spheres, are likely to take place during trade shows. 
Consultants
Even when they do not participate directly in some economic 
transactions, consultants may contribute to the de!nition of some 
valuation frames for products or job candidates. We can give the 
example of the style bureaus of the fashion trend such as it is reported 
by Rinallo and Golfetto (2006). These authors show how the material, 
cognitive and interactive dimensions of some trade shows (like 
“Première Vision”) help conventions (on future styles) to be spread 
and valued within the clothing fabric industry, and more generally 
within creative industries. At the beginning, these conventions are 
issued from a process of discussion between French and Italian 
manufacturers considered to be the most innovative. They answer to a 
very fragmented textile industry and to the need to reduce the 
uncertainty about the qualities of textile products (color, structure, 
aspect, touch, decoration, and treatment). This reduction of 
uncertainty may improve the coordination between the different 
actors. Nevertheless, if the identi!cation of the future trends is 
proposed by the internal experts of producers (members of “Première 
vision”), the authors point out the crucial role played by style bureaus 
in this process. These companies are specialized in trend forecasting 
and they operate in different creative industries. They can be 
considered as “brokers of language” as they connect material 
properties of clothes and symbolic meanings about products. This 
connecting activity contributes to the “bodily anchorage” of 
conventions (Bessy and Chateauraynaud 1995). 
Generally speaking, once they have invested in the design of a 
valuation frame, consultants try to spread it within an economic sector 
or in different economic !elds. A good illustration could be the 
consultant agencies in employment and salaries, which set up 
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de!nitions of positions that stand for a whole range of companies, at 
the least for the biggest ones, in order to establish a salary hierarchy. 
Reynaud (1992) showed that this kind of consultant agencies had 
to carry out surveys in order to gather information about the salaries 
in each company. In order to do so, they have to transform the 
information they have gathered into comparable items: the value of 
surveys depends on equivalence decisions between positions for which 
names differ. Moreover, their clients do not receive passively the 
results of the surveys, they adapt their strategies to these results and to 
the norms they have contributed to build. By this mechanism, the 
activity of consultant agencies has some consequences on the work 
organization and the salary practices of their clients, and they 
participate in building the economic value attributed to their 
employees. Reynaud interprets the role of the consultant agencies as a 
kind of “Walrasian auctioneer” that organizes the “tâtonnement” and 
that serves as intermediaries between the companies and the market 
considered as a set of socially constructed information. We may add 
that they contribute to the cognitive segmentation of the market by 
creating some new valuations conventions of workers and positions. 
These conventions are all the more powerful as they are followed by 
the companies that were not in the panel of the survey.
This power of valuation can also be attached to a “signature” that 
the consultant uses as a more or less explicit strategic tool. The wine 
consu l tants can for example be va lued through the i r 
”oenological  signature” (Chauvin 2010b), which recently entered the 
repertoire of valuation frames for wines. This signature consists in the 
type of intervention in the wine estates (regular/occasional), the type of 
public presentation of the consultant (discrete/visible) and the way it is 
associated with products (strongly/weakly), and the qualitative style of 
the wines he or she contributes to produce. Even though a signature is 
a source of reputation that can be transferred to products, it is an asset 
that consultants have dif!culty assuming because of the importance of 
the soil and vintage in the making of reputations in the French wine 
industry. 
The main question raised by these examples is the imputation of 
the responsibility of a particular consultant (or consultant agency) in 
the emergence of a new valuation frame or a new category of goods, in 
contrast to the case of a distributed building among a plurality of 
consultants and other intermediaries. 
Evaluators
If the three previous types of intermediaries carry out activities that 
have some consequences in terms of valuations, their core activity does 
not explicitly consist in producing evaluations, rankings or ratings. 
However, we can now identify and analyze a fourth type of 
intermediaries whose main activities precisely rely on producing such 
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devices. There is a growing amount of works focusing on such actors 
and their effects, as western contemporary societies can be thought as 
audit societies (Power 1999), in which !nancial, medical, 
technological, environmental, quality, and many other types of 
evaluations are produced by a set of professionalized actors. Espeland 
and Sauder (2007) proposed to conceptualize such actors as “third 
parties” that foster some social “reactivities” in the worlds they 
evaluate. They especially focus on the third parties in the education 
sector, that is to say actors that are neither suppliers nor demanders of 
education goods, for example education media. Such actors produce 
some rankings that create or reinforce some criteria of valuations 
(number of students, number of international scienti!c prizes, 
students’ professional careers etc.) that can become “conventional” in 
the !eld. These conventions of valuation are interiorized by the 
majority of evaluated actors, who may modify their organizational and 
communication strategy to conform as well as possible to the criteria 
fostered by the rankings. This case accounts for the possible 
instrumentalization of the valuation criteria by the evaluated actors, 
but also for the dif!culty to escape from the “discipline” of rankings. 
These effects raise the social issue of the negative or “bad” 
conventions that are created or spread within the academic world but 
also in the !nancial world (Orléan 2011) and many others.
“Bad” as well as “good” effects of valuations are not necessarily 
the product of an explicit strategy and can emerge progressively 
through unexpected social mechanisms. The activity of the wine critic 
Robert Parker is a good case for understanding how a powerful 
evaluator may foster “despite himself” some new conventions and 
categorizations on the wine market. If he deliberately created and 
spread an innovative format of wines valuation (a 50-100 point 
quality scale), he also fostered some more informal and unintended 
categories of valuations within this economic world. While arguing for 
his “prescriptive” recommendations in terms of the information he 
provided to consumers, he assigned points and made judgments that, 
once adopted and “interpreted” in the oenophile community, gave rise 
to new categorizations, of which he himself may have been a target 
(Chauvin 2010a). 
The controversial category of “Parkerized wines” is a good 
illustration of this, and shows how an intermediary can become the 
source of retroactive implementation of the strategies of some wine 
producers. The unanticipated effect of the intermediary’s activity in 
this case is the producers’ introduction of new production methods 
with the goal of improving their standing in the Parker ratings. On a 
meso-level, this can contribute to a new con!guration of the 
conventions of quality in the considered market. This case shows that 
the strategic valuation activities of intermediaries are themselves 
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subject to new interpretations and unforeseen categorizations made by 
other market players. 
Despite their professional heterogeneity, these four types of 
intermediaries share a common characteristic, which is not a substance 
or a !xed identity but is based on the dynamics they foster: the power 
of valuation of an intermediary can be measured through the effects of 
the valuations it produces, whatever their forms or their logics may be. 
Intermediaries’ Power of Valuation: Definition, Generality and 
Temporality 
As long as their role as prescribers is recognized (Benghosi and Paris 
2003), market intermediaries can have a prominent part in the 
creation and the dissemination of conventions and the resulting 
categorization of goods, people and organizations. All intermediaries 
do not have a strong valuation power. Generally speaking, power is an 
unequally distributed resource, and it is an empirical question to assess 
to what extent each intermediary enjoy this speci!c kind of power. 
However, we can suggest some distinctions and analytical tools in 
order to identify some important factors that lead to these 
asymmetrical situations. At the end of this sub-section, we will also 
propose a picture synthesizing the three main characteristics of the 
valuation frames and the way they can help to categorize the different 
examples of intermediaries referred to in our paper.
The Definition of the Valuation Frame: Distributed versus 
Concentrated
As we have already mentioned (concerning the consultants), one may 
distinguish two polar cases of the de!nition of the valuation frame. 
First, valuation frames may come from a plurality of intermediaries 
that share the same conception of what constitutes the value of a 
product. Second, they may result from the activity of a single and 
dominant intermediary (a high standard consulting job agency, a 
famous "ying winemaker, or a reputed model agent) that succeeds in 
spreading to his or her clients what is worth or what is valued in a 
speci!c !eld. So, the de!nition of the valuation frame is more or less 
distributed between different intermediaries.
We can note that in the former case, the power of valuation is often 
attached to a professional status that confers a symbolic authority. In 
the latter case, the legitimacy of the intermediary may be less stabilized 
and protected than the one attached to a professional group, and leads 
him or her to make a permanent “reputational work” (Za!rau 2008). 
Thus, according to Rinallo and Golfetto (2006), the ability of the 
producers in the textile and clothing industry (members of “Premiere 
Vision”) to represent the market and to make it real is attributed, in 
line with a Bourdieusian argument, to the differences of “symbolic 
capital”. This speci!c kind of capital depends on the particular 
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characteristics of each market, and is often linked to the temporality of 
the “entry” on the market. The !rst intermediaries who can be 
identi!ed and collectively recognized as innovators, can progressively 
acquire the legitimacy and the status of “pioneers” and can impose 
new trends to the “followers” of the markets.
The Generality of the Valuation Frame: Standard versus Singular
The valuation power of intermediaries can also be analyzed through 
the degree of generality of the frames they contribute to elaborate.
First, it seems important to distinguish the intermediaries who 
build the market by centralizing and reallocating the information 
through standardized categories of quality, and those who generally 
act at a local level, every matching being different from the other ones, 
according to a negotiation process of the quality that occurs during the 
evaluation. This latter case is more interesting to analyze with a 
pragmatist approach, as standardized and centralized valuation 
processes are by de!nition less interactional and uncertain in their 
progress.
Recruitment processes in the !eld of highly innovative jobs give a 
good illustration of the situations in which the skills of the candidates 
or the relevant qualities of the product emerge from an interactive 
process of information exchange (Bessy 1997). The client !rm and the 
intermediary learn from the CV of the candidates the ins and outs of 
the job searched and the required skills. The candidates try, from their 
part, to pro!le their experience and their skill according to the 
speci!city of the potential employer. In this case, intermediaries are 
involved in a highly distributed and negotiated valuation process, in 
which every actor in"uences the other one. Commenting the works of 
Kreiner (2007) on architecture competitions, Stark (2011) identi!es 
the same kind of interactive process of rede!nition of the principles of 
evaluation during the competition process. The projects of the 
competitors also serve to better de!ne the real problems that have to 
be solved, as well as the operational principles for a successful 
performance. 
Stark notices that this implies a shift from the resolution of an 
analytical problem (for example through the analysis of standard 
matching in transaction costs approach) to questions of interpretations 
(which could be developed in a conventionalist and pragmatist 
approach of speci!c matching), which can be thought of with the help 
of Dewey’s pragmatist approach, according to which the relevant 
valuation principles are generally built during the evaluation process. 
This more interactional and uncertain evaluation process is likely to be 
present in the beginning of the development of a new activity or a new 
technology.
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The Temporality of the Valuation Frame: Short-Term versus 
Long-Term
The distinction between standardized and singular matches can be 
completed by a close look at the “temporal” dimension of the 
valuation power. 
Markets distinguish themselves by combining, differently, various 
kinds of temporal valuation frames. In a !rst perspective, one may link 
some particular markets with some speci!c temporal frames: for 
example, the !nancial market has become a short-term valuation 
sphere, according to a vast literature on !nancial evaluators. Work by 
Montagne (2009) shows, for example, how the increased delegating of 
investment funds management has contributed to creating a 
professional services market (consultants, managers, appraisers, and 
rating agencies) and standards methods of scoring and pricing (Beunza 
and Garud 2004). Parallel with this standardization, their activity is 
likely to entrench the short-term as the dominant economic time-
frame. The increased importance of consultants and various other 
intermediaries with the job of measuring performance has created two 
kinds of constraint for !nancial management companies—quantitative 
(performance markers) and qualitative (organizational audit)—as well 
as systematizing competition. As Montagne states (2009, 8), “the 
creation of a market in valuation, affecting both managers and 
appraisers, is thus directly responsible for the standardization of 
methods of valuation and for their alignment with short-term 
investment methods.” Intermediaries are thus not external actors, but 
impact directly on the dynamics of valuation by shortening its time-
frame. 
A second approach may try to identify how different types of 
temporal valuation frames are articulated in the same market and 
what role intermediaries play in these temporal “frictions”. For 
example, if fashion trends are short-term valuation frames that are 
supposed to be renewed each year, one may try to identify how they 
are linked with more stabilized valuation frames. On the fashion 
market, these frames could be the “names” of the fashion houses 
which give a kind of “status depth” to this market, by transferring 
their longer, more stable worth to the other “names” or “products” of 
the market. On the French wine market, if of!cial classi!cations 
represent long-term valuation frames (in the both sense of stable 
frames and frames whose legitimacy is linked to their longevity), they 
are challenged by other types of frames, especially the annually 
renewed rates given by critics. Intermediaries such as wine critics not 
only convey new short-term temporal frames, but they have to deal 
with long-term frames (by respecting them and showing they just 
produce marginal newness), and they can paradoxically reinforce them 
by their work (Chauvin 2010a). Our distinction between short-term 
and long-term valuation frames is a schematic way of analyzing the 
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plurality of temporalities involved in economic worlds. Further work 
may take advantage of the important sociological literature which 
deconstructs the idea of “time” or “temporality” by identifying the 
various forms of temporalities that structure social life (Fine 1990; 
Flaherty 2003).
In order to sum up our results, table 1 (below) is an attempt to 
classify the different examples quoted until now, according to the 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The !rst criteria, based upon the type of de!nition of the valuation 
frames, concerns actors, whereas the two others (the temporality and 
the generality) concern more the valuation frames and their “social 
forms”. When we combine the three criteria (distribution, temporality, 
generality), we can distinguish between two stylized con!gurations. 
The !rst con!guration involves powerful intermediaries, stable and 
standard frames. In this case, intermediaries have a strong power of 
valuation because they are at the origin of the de!nition of the 
valuation frames, which are not negotiated in situations and are 
persistent over time. 
The second con!guration consists in less powerful intermediaries, 
negotiated and singular frames. In this case, intermediaries have less 
power because the valuation frame is de!ned among many actors, 
constantly negotiated and relevant only during the time of the 
valuation process. Intermediaries adopt local conventions which 
emerge from the valuation process, and none of the intermediaries has 
a dominant role. Obviously, there is a continuum between these 
extreme cases, along which the various empirical cases could be 
distributed. Beyond the examples quoted in this paper, our hypothesis 
is that all intermediaries can be located in this kind of table. One may 
think of empirical cases such as matchmakers on the “online dating” 
market. The websites analyzed by Cornwell and Lundgren (2001), 
Bergström (2011) or Kessous (2011) are intermediaries which 
participate in constructing the “value” of the potential partners, 
through the selection criteria of the partner (age, sex, location, but also 
social, cultural and economic characteristics), the type of access to the 
different areas of the website, the type of evaluation of previous 
partners that can display the members of the website, and the visibility 
offered to some particular members who appear on the main page of 
the website. If we follow our typology, this kind of intermediary could 
be analyzed as a “distributed” case (Bergström studies for example 
more than one thousand websites). The two other characteristics of the 
intermediaries (the temporality and the generality of the frames they 
produce) would probably be “short-term” (because of the frequent 
change of the selection criteria displayed by the websites and the 
rapidity of the production and publication of an evaluation by 
members) and “singular” (because of the speci!c criteria displayed by 
the websites according to ethnic or religious parameters for example). 
The analytic fecundity of this typology could be illustrated by many 
other examples from different markets.
Explaining and Regulating the Valuation Power of 
Intermediaries: Two Challenging Tasks
The characterization of the valuation frames fostered and used by 
intermediaries is helpful to understand their activity and how they 
shape value dynamics on market. However, it may not be enough to 
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explain their unequal valuation power, as they do not all have such 
effects on their economic world. A few sociological theories can be 
useful to solve this problem by focusing on different legitimatizing 
sources: the “symbolic capital” (Bourdieu 1993) of the intermediary, 
the legitimacy of the convention used by the actors (Boltanski and 
Thévenot 2006), or a network of aligned actors that is produced by 
different operations of mediation (Latour 2005). These different 
approaches of legitimacy can be considered as alternatives (Lamont 
2012), but a clear-cut distinction of this kind may be dif!cult to make 
in empirical markets, as the case of the fashion trends analyzed by 
Rinallo and Golfetto (2006) shows it. The question of explanation of 
the diffusion of conventions represents a problem that goes beyond the 
scope of this paper, and that would need to be developed in further 
research. 
The second question is the corollary of the power of intermediaries: 
if their actions have some effects on the social worlds they are involved 
in, one may study the nature of the transformations they foster, and 
what kind of control or regulation one may organize to limit their 
“negative” or “pernicious” effects. The conventionalist approach can 
give some analytical tools to answer some sociopolitical questions such 
as the “!nancial crisis” by highlighting the role of the intermediaries in 
the creation, the diffusion and the transformation of conventions in 
crisis’ dynamics. In fact, intermediaries’ interventions can weaken the 
!nancial system because of the dif!culty to attribute some 
responsibilities to the multiple concerned actors. The proliferation of 
!nancial intermediaries and products has made it much more dif!cult 
to determine liability during the recent !nancial crisis (Montagne 
2009). Cervone’s work on credit rating agencies shows for example 
how dif!cult it is to assign liability for errors or fraud to valuation 
intermediaries. She points out that, especially in the American context, 
investors who !led lawsuits for damages involving erroneous 
assessments made by credit rating agencies had their suits dismissed. In 
a recent article (Cervone 2010), she advocates the adoption of a strict 
liability regime, rather than yet more regulation of the activity of these 
agencies. Krebs (2009) and Tuch (2010) also underlined the power 
and the role of credit rating agencies during the current economic crisis 
by showing that their judgments and evaluations are far from neutral 
and that their impact as “reputational intermediaries” needs some 
kind of regulation.
In contrast, Orléan (2009) shows that these rating agencies are only 
the bearers of valuation conventions (the interpretation of underlying 
market trends) in place at a given point in the !nancial markets, which 
all stakeholders (both issuers and investors) agree to adopt. It is thus 
the market itself that constrains the rating agencies. Orléan concludes: 
“In my opinion there is no evidence that anything like a rating agency 
independent of the market could exist. For that to happen, it would 
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have to derive its income from a source that was itself independent, yet 
without seeming to be a foreign body with no legitimacy in the eyes of 
the investors. Is this not trying to square the circle?” (Orléan 2009, 
68). Liability, then, is spread across all the players in the !nancial 
system, making it problematic to attempt to impute liability to any 
individual. 
There are many other domains in which the regulation of the 
evaluators’ activities could play an important role. The research led by 
Demailly and Maroy (2004) about the regulation of the educative 
system in Europe shows, for example, how some new types of 
intermediaries both evaluate and control educative organizations and 
institutions. The rise of “post–bureaucratic” institutional settings, such 
as the ex post control exerted by evaluators, or the ex ante socializing 
action on the professionals (teachers and administrative staff), implies 
new types of cross-regulation between states, educative institutions, 
and the new “transnational” intermediaries. These intermediaries, who 
generally come from teaching, become either “experts in 
rationalization”, “agents of proximity”, or “political executives”. 
According to our typology, they can be classi!ed as “evaluators”, but 
the diversity of their status should not be overlooked, because it can 
explain why organizations aimed at regulating these intermediaries 
only exist in an embryonic form.
Concerning matchmakers and consultants, as they defend the 
interest of the parties they represent as well as their self-interest, this 
issue of the regulation of their activities is at stake.13 That raises also 
the question of the drawing up professional-ethics rules to guarantee 
that experts in the concerned !elds will be reasonably disinterested and 
will avoid con"icts of interests. Besides, these intermediation activities 
can be a source of “boundary struggles” (Lamont and Molnar 2002) 
between different professions or professional territories which are 
arbitrated by public authorities (Abbott 1989). Whereas Economic 
theory designs regulation of professions mainly in reference to the 
concepts of “asymmetrical information” (between the professional and 
its client) and “externality”, our notion of “power of valuation” 
proposes another way to cope with this issue that would need further 
development.
Conclusion
New developments in economic theory justify the emergence of 
intermediaries by their role in reducing the costs of information search, 
or more generally the transaction costs. In this perspective, 
intermediaries generally improve the functioning of markets. More 
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13 Lizé, Naudier and Roueff (2011) emphasize the problem of the legal quali!cation 
of “intermediary” which cannot be, in the case of the French Law, both “third 
party” and “party” to a contractual relationship.
precisely, intermediaries often add value to products by supplying 
information and guaranties or by increasing their availability (Spulber 
1996). This analysis of the market microstructures offers a better 
understanding of the real workings of markets by highlighting the 
different roles played by intermediaries which are not limited to the 
sole function of pricing. But this added value is reduced to a potential 
increase in the utility of goods for consumers, the de!nition of 
individual preferences remaining exogenous. There are few economists 
who take into account the endogeneity of preferences or even the 
collective construction of valuation (such as graduates in the Spence 
signal theory, Spence 1973), so leaving a large part of collective 
valuation processes unexplored.
The pragmatist approach presented in our paper completes the 
perspectives in which intermediaries are rather a passive role of 
information platform. In particular, economics of convention shows 
how intermediaries contribute to de!ne valuation frames through their 
different activities and instigate conventions that can improve the 
coordination of actors in markets, but also reorganize the markets in 
different ways. The analysis of valuation conventions may provide a 
better understanding of the strategic behavior of market intermediaries 
which is intended to “destabilize” the market. This approach is 
consistent with previous studies highlighting how market inter-
mediaries could be more than passive classi!ers, especially through the 
concept of “frame-makers” suggested by Beunza and Garud (2004). 
The four types of intermediaries identi!ed in this article allow us to 
underline that the dynamics of valuation frames constitute an 
important dimension of the activity of so-called “evaluators”, but also 
of the activity of “distributors”, “matchmakers” and “consultants”. 
Moreover, we propose a characterization of these valuation frames 
according to the nature of their de!nition (more or less distributed), 
their generality and their temporality. 
Once they have been differentiated in terms of their effects, 
intermediaries can be a good empirical entry to study the social 
organization of markets as well as the changes occurring in them, 
including changes in the social and economic value of goods, 
individuals, and organizations. Besides, these changes raise the issue of 
the valuation power of market intermediaries and the eventual 
regulation of their activities. 
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